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Applicant faking poses serious threats to achieving personality-based fit, negatively affecting
both the worker and the organization. In articulating this “faking-is-bad” (FIB) position, Tett
and Simonet (2021) identify Marcus’ (2009) self-presentation theory (SPT) as representative
of the contrarian “faking-is-good” camp by its advancement of self-presentation as beneficial
in hiring contexts. In this rejoinder, we address 20 of Marcus’ (2021) claims in highlighting
his reliance on an outdated empiricist rendering of validity, loosely justified rejection of the
negative and moralistic “faking” label, disregard for the many challenges posed by blatant
forms of faking, inattention to faking research supporting the FIB position, indefensibly
ambiguous constructs, and deep misunderstanding of person–workplace fit based on
personality assessment. In demonstrating these and other limitations of Marcus’ critique, we
firmly uphold the FIB position and clarify SPT as headed in the wrong direction.

Marcus (2021) offers a lively rebuke of Tett and Simonet’s (2021) framing of faking on self-report personality
tests and its implications for personality-based fit through
hiring. In this brief rejoinder, we address 20 of Marcus’
claims, clarifying misunderstandings and defending key
points. We have no issues with Marcus’ three “golden
rules.” How they are applied to the original T&S article,
however, warrants clarification in several respects. We begin with an overview of how personality tests are intended
to assist in achieving worker–workplace fit through hiring
Personality traits are relatively unique and stable propensities to behave, think, and feel, thereby reliably differentiating among individuals and allowing prediction of
their future behavior, thoughts, and feelings. Differentiation
and prediction make personality traits useful targets of assessment in hiring, whose chief task is differentiating job
applicants predicted to behave, think, and feel in ways valued positively on the job. Hiring well is beneficial to both
the worker and the hiring organization because people want
to work where they are rewarded for being themselves, and
organizations do best when their workers are trait motivated (Tett et al., 2013; Tett et al., 2021). Achieving a good fit
requires valid assessment of both trait-relevant work demands and applicants’ traits. Faking poses serious challeng-
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es to valid personality assessment, and so identifying and
limiting faking are critical for relying on personality tests
in achieving fit through employment screening.
This generally accepted view of the role of personality
assessment in worker–workplace fit is consistent with best
hiring practices (SIOP, 2018)1 and largely supported by decades of research and practice linking personality with job
performance (e.g., Judge & Zapata, 2015; Tett et al., 1999),
career interests (Barrick et al., 2003), and various other
work-related outcomes. With this foundation in mind, we
identify in Table 1 a list of 20 claims, ordered as presented
in Marcus’ paper, and our responses from the “faking-isbad” perspective. Space constraints preclude comprehensive rebuttals. We address five of Marcus’ more critical
claims in limited detail.
Claim 1: Marcus claims the FIB position presented

Corresponding author:
Robert P. Tett
Author Email: robert-tett@utulsa.edu
1 Such practices also call for identification of job-related attributes
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TABLE 1.
20 Claims by Marcus and FIB Position Responses
Section

Marcus' claims

pp. Responses from a FIB perspective

1 Faking from two perspectives
1 T&S focus too little on faking from the
applicant's perspective.

36

See main text.

2 “[T]he only perspective that will take us
closer to understanding [faking or related
concepts] is that of the applicant, not the
employer."

36

The employer contributes uniquely to understanding
faking by its choice of targeted traits, how those traits
are identified, the test environment, response instructions
(e.g., faking warnings), and the tests themselves regarding
validity and susceptibility to response distortion.
Rejecting faking from the employer's perspective is
counterproductive.

3 The primary goal of SPT is to “understand
what is going on in personnel selection," as
though faking researchers adopting a FIB
approach have some other aim.

36

FIB researchers share exactly the same aim. Where they
differ is in their approach to meeting it. Why Marcus
would imply FIB researchers have a different aim is
unclear.

4 The FIB position portrays the organization
and applicant as courtroom judges and
defendants and as examiners overseeing
students taking an exam.

36

These are good analogies Marcus leaves unexplored.
Marcus' approach suggests cheating on an exam is
acceptable and even desirable, failing to recognize the
direct threat it poses to validity.

5 The organization and applicant are (instead)
like two daters.

36

See main text.

6 "Informed motivation" to self-present
depends, in part, on “the discrepancy between
(honest) self-image and perceived employer’s
expectations such that larger discrepancies
tend to lower informed motivation” (italics
in original), which is opposite the FIB
perspective.

36

Marcus ignores findings showing that, counter to his
claim, respondents with lower honest scores (on a
desirable trait) fake more because they have more room
to fake up (e.g., McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Tett et al.,
2012).

7 The idea that faking opportunity is related to
faking behavior is a tautology.

37

Marcus does not explain the tautology because there is
no tautology. A low honest score leaves more opportunity
to fake up, and respondents with lower honest scores
actually do fake more.

8 The selection setting is competitive so we
should not bother trying to assess and control
faking.

37

The inherently competitive nature of hiring is a major
motivator for faking. Ignoring faking is a capitulation,
threatening personality assessment aims.

continued
by T&S favors the organization’s perspective over that of
the applicant and that serving the interests of either party
is inappropriate. We offer two responses. First, Principle A
of the APA Ethical Principles (2017) states, “Psychologists
strive to benefit those with whom they work and take care
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to do no harm.” Contrary to Marcus’ stance, serving the
interests of relevant parties is, in a very direct sense, job #1
for all psychologists. The FIB position directly exemplifies
this principle by explicitly seeking to advance the interests
of both workers and organizations through improved per-
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TABLE 1. (CONTINUED)
20 Claims by Marcus and FIB Position Responses
Section

Marcus' claims

pp. Responses from a FIB perspective

2 Faking as morally bad behavior
9 Marcus suggests fraudulent faking “is a clear
violation of widely accepted social norms.”

37

Agreed.

10 Non-fraudulent forms of faking include
attempts to adapt to the employer’s
expectations.

37

Counter to the idea that such aspirational responding
might contribute to valid prediction, research shows
faking weakens personality test validity (e.g., Christiansen et al., 2017; Christiansen et al., 2020; Jeong et
al., 2017). Because the biggest fakers are those with the
greatest opportunity to fake, hiring someone opposite a
good fit for the job cannot be compensated by "adaptive"
intentions (Tett & Christiansen, 2007).

11 Identifying all upward response distortion
as having the same cause (i.e., faking) is
unscientific; it is more scientific that “the label
of self-presentation is open to all kinds of
meanings and interpretations.”

38

See main text.

12 "Self-presentation" is preferred over
"faking" because the former, unlike the latter,
is amoral.

38

(a) Marcus implies the morality of a behavior is tied
to the quality of research inferences drawn about that
behavior, but he never articulates the basis for that
connection.
(b) As with employee theft, abusive supervision,
harrassment, bullying, and falsification of documents,
faking is both harmful and intentional, warranting
recognition as immoral behavior. Recognizing this in no
way undermines the quality of scientific inferences about
faking and similarly undesirable behaviors. Marcus offers
no evidence to support his loosely presented inference.
(c) Faking warrants research attention precisely because
it leads to negative consequences. T&S articulate 12
problems with faking, all of which Marcus either ignores
or fails to counter. Recognizing faking as intentional is
important in understanding and managing it.
(d) Changing the "faking" label would not eliminate
the behavior nor its negative consequences. "Faking"
is easily understood by researchers, practitioners, and
organizations. It is a perfectly apt label.

13 Marcus agrees with T&S' assessment that
research on the effects of faking on the validity
of personality tests for predicting performance
is mixed.

38

Closer examination of the faking literature shows faking
severely undermines personality test validity in selection
applications (e.g., Jeong et al., 2017). The ambiguous
research findings are due to inappropriate reliance on
social desirability scales as faking measures (e.g., Barrick & Mount, 1996; Ones et al., 1996), and low power
to detect suppressor effects (Burns & Christiansen, 2006;
Christiansen et al., 1994; Goffin & Christiansen, 2003).

continued
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TABLE 1. (CONTINUED)
20 Claims by Marcus and FIB Position Responses
Section Marcus' claims
14 Marcus offers an example of an applicant
with an honest score of 4 intentionally
elevating it to 5.

pp. Responses from a FIB perspective
38

This example understates the problem of faking. Cases
where an honest 1 or 2 is deliberately elevated to a 4 or 5
are ignored.

15 Validity understood as job-relatedness does
not require a targeted construct. 		

38

See main text.

16 X = T + e can be expanded into X = T
+ b + s + e, where b = bias and s = "social
meaning." From this, two scores can be split
off: Xc = T + b + e, targeting a construct, and
Xs = s + e. Xs offers incremental prediction of
performance beyond Xc.

39

Marcus recognizes b as including faking but ignores (a)
all its negative effects on validity inferences articulated
by T&S and (b) how it can offset any possible benefit
afforded by Xs. Marcus also ignores research showing
that (c) response distortion does not predict job
performance (e.g., Jeong et al., 2017), (d) aspirational
responding cannot account for actual faking (e.g.,
overclaiming, Bing et al., 2011; bogus items, Anderson
et al., 1984; faking admissions, Donovan et al., 2002),
and (e) faking predicts CWBs positively (Peterson et al.,
2011), as cited by T&S.

3 The consequences of faking

17 The ideal employee coefficient (IEC) offers 40
separation of trait and response distortion
variance.

IEC is defined as a mix of skills and motivational
components without reference to job-specific demands.
As with self-presentation, lack of a clear definition and
nomological net impedes scientific advance based on
IEC.

18 Surprisingly, T&S define validity without
reference to context.

40

Emphasis on constructs as critical for understanding
validity does not imply contexts are irrelevant. The
screening context is what makes faking a threat to
the valid assessment of targeted traits. Anyone who
understands validity and how personality tests are
expected to promote worker-workplace fit should not be
surprised by reliance on a construct-focused definition of
validity.

19 Personality tests used in selection settings
are maximum performance tests.

40

Personality tests are not designed to be performance
tests (typical or maximal) and their value as vehicles
for personality-based fit is undercut to the degree they
behave as such (Tett & Simonet, 2011).

20 "Faking is good" is a "stupid" credo.

41

See main text.

sonality-based fit.
Second, it is false at both a basic level and in application that the FIB position favors the organization’s perspective. All the various types of faking articulated by Griffith
et al. (2011) and cited by T&S are identified from the applicant’s point of view. For example, fraudulent faking is when
an applicant knowingly falsifies self-report responses; ex-
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aggeration is when the applicant seeks to “polish the truth.”
Faking is an applicant’s behavior; it is applicant generated,
applicant motivated, and applicant presented. Obviously, efforts to detect and manage faking must focus on applicants’
psychological processes serving each type of faking.
The FIB position also does not take sides when it
comes to the threat of faking. Several passages in T&S
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make this clear. On p. 12, for example, T&S note that faking:
is detrimental to both the organization and the applicant. Even if faking affords useful prediction of
performance, it cannot engender job satisfaction from
trait-based PE fit (Charbonneau et al., 2021); good fit
accrues to the degree the individual’s traits help meet
work demands (Christiansen et al., 2014; Tett et al.,
2013). Faking essentially guarantees poor fit over time
in terms of trait-based satisfaction, promising weaker
work motivation and higher withdrawal.
Similar statements are found on pp. 11, 13, and 15. The FIB
approach clearly considers faking a threat to both organizations and applicants, even nonfaking applicants. Marcus’
suggestion that T&S minimize faking from the applicant’s
perspective is unfounded.
Claim 5: Marcus claims an organization and applicant are like two daters seeking a compatible relationship,
and that, “If [the daters] come to the conclusion that such
[a] relation is desirable, they then have to convince their
prospective partner to arrive at the same conclusion about
themselves” (p. 36). Marcus seems to be suggesting that
compatibility would be achieved by any sort of convincing, regardless of its truth value. As often occurs in dating,
the two parties may have incompatible aims.2 By Marcus’
account, if a sex-seeking dater can smooth-talk a commitment-seeking dater to consent to having sex, then compatibility has been achieved. But compatibility occurs only
when each party actually provides what the other seeks.
The organization seeks a worker with traits serving performance, loyalty, and longevity, whereas the faker seeks to
be hired regardless of actual fit. These are fundamentally
irreconcilable aims. By conflating “convincing” and “compatibility,” Marcus shows a deep misunderstanding of person–workplace fit and the role of personality assessment in
achieving it.
Claim 11: Marcus claims “it is essentially unscientific
to conclude one specific meaning simply from observing
the behavior” (p. 38) and touts as some unstated scientific advantage the fact that “the label of self-presentation
is open to all kinds of meanings and interpretations” (p.
38). We offer four responses. First, Marcus never explains
why a single interpretation is less scientific than multiple
interpretations. Science advances by winnowing down all
possible explanations to those best supported by theory and
evidence. In principle, there is nothing unscientific in promoting a single best interpretation for anything. Second, the
FIB position identifies not one interpretation of response
distortion but four, each a distinct type of faking supported
by evidence and reason (Griffith et al., 2011). Third, interpretations are more scientifically sound when based on
clearly defined terms. The FIB perspective defines faking
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as deliberate upward responding to personality test items
so as to improve one’s chances of getting hired (Griffith et
al., 2011). Marcus’ promotion of self-presentation as “open
to all kinds of meanings and interpretations” directly opposes the scientific precept of definitional clarity. Finally,
self-presentation is one of the four types of faking identified
by Griffith et al. (2011). Despite its noble presentation, aspirational responding per Marcus’ version of self-presentation fits the definition of faking from the FIB perspective.3
Definitions matter and if Marcus seeks to distance self-presentation from faking, he needs to articulate the distinction
in a way that makes that clear.
Claim 15: Marcus promotes an empiricist rendering of
validity emphasizing job-relatedness. In contrast, the unitarian perspective strongly endorsed by T&S says test validity
boils down to theory and evidence bearing on the accuracy
of test scores for a stated purpose in light of a targeted construct (SIOP, 2018). The nature of validity has been debated
and definitions refined over many decades (e.g., Binning &
Barrett, 1989; Borsboom et al., 2004; Cronbach & Meehl,
1955; Guion, 1980; Gulliksen, 1950; SIOP, 2018). Here we
note the construct-based interpretation precludes a purely
empirical rendering of job relatedness, whereas job relatedness permits a construct-based rendering of validity. A
test that correlates with performance may be judged as job
related by a purely empirical standard, but one that does so
without a targeted construct fails to meet the more rigorous
construct standard (SIOP, 2018).
Beyond the semantics of validity and job relatedness,
T&S articulate four other challenges that Marcus entirely
ignores. Purely empirical renderings of validity (a) are not
only incompatible with contemporary understanding of
validity, they also (b) impede test evaluation and development, (c) undermine execution of multiconstruct assessment
plans, (d) promote acquiescence in limiting threats to personality-based fit, and (e) ignore effects of nontargeted variance on assessment of interitem and interscale structure. By
failing to counter these points, Marcus’ arguments favoring
systematic nontargeted test score variance fail to displace
the unitarian model of validity as best selection practice.
Claim 20: In his concluding remarks, Marcus retorts
that “faking is good” is a “stupid” label. We disagree. SPT
recognizes at least the fraudulent form of faking but ignores
its various threats to personality test validity in achieving
fit. Concomitantly, Marcus fails to distinguish his version
of self-presentation from a form of faking bearing the same
2 Evolutionary psychology has long established differential mating strategies for men and women stemming from biological principles of parental investment. Trivers (1972) is the seminal foundation
for this, and Schmitt (2005), among many other sources, articulates
the fundamentals.
3 Stealing food to feed one’s family may be a noble act, but it is
stealing nonetheless.

http://scholarworks.bgsu.edu/pad/

Faking Is as Faking Does

Personnel Assessment and Decisions
label clearly defined by the FIB camp (Griffith et al., 2011).
He advances this form of response distortion as desirable in
the form of IEC and Xs, but instead of offering definitional
clarity, Marcus promotes self-presentation as “open to all
kinds of meanings and interpretations.” Any approach to
response distortion that recognizes faking but ignores its
negative consequences and encourages reliance on deliberate, ambiguously nontargeted scale variance carrying the
same negative consequences fully earns membership in the
“faking-is-good” camp.
In closing, we note there is a long history of thought
on the link between morality and knowledge, between personal values and empirical observations and their judged
importance in scientific investigation (Becker, 1976; Hume,
1739/1961). Challenging arguments and results based on
whether or not one likes the terminology invites confusion
of fact with personal preference. Denial is not refutation. By
putting the desirability of construct labels and consequences ahead of inferential rigor based on definitional precision,
as permeates Marcus’ critique, we degrade the power of science to lead us to better futures. Marcus astutely notes the
world will keep spinning with the loss of valid personality
assessment in hiring. We suggest a spinning world is a low
bar for scientific advance. Personality has untapped potential to deliver improved fit between workers and their work
situations and Marcus’ disregard of faking—or whatever
he wants to call it—is a willful step backward in that more
optimistic and productive pursuit.
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